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Abstract
Climate change will cause significant loss and damage throughout New Zealand. This will affect 
everyone. When considering the options for responding, compensation will inevitably be raised, as either 
a requirement or a policy choice. Many people, however, appear reticent to engage with ‘compensation’ 
either as a word or as a concept; preferring to avoid it altogether. This article argues that compensation 
will be an unavoidable part of the discussion about how best to respond to the challenges of climate 
change. It is an integral aspect of the law of compulsory acquisition and the Public Works Act. It sits 
in the background to both legal and popular understandings of other statutory regimes such as the 
Biosecurity and Earthquake Commission Acts. This article explores the ramifications of this observation 
from a legal perspective and suggests that careful thought should be given, as soon as possible, to the 
development of a principled approach to compensation for climate change loss and damage. 
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Climate change will cause a range of problems, with inevitable loss and damage for individuals, 
businesses, and government (PCE, 2015; 
Abbott, 2014). How best to adapt to 
these challenges is  a question currently 
receiving significant attention (Cooper 
and Pile, 2013; NZCPS, 2010; Hayward, 
2008). It is clear that adaptation will result 
in increasing and ‘unavoidable’ costs to 
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There’s one issue that will define the contours of this 
century more dramatically than any other, and that is 
the urgent and growing threat of a changing climate.
U.S. President Barack Obama (Obama, 2014)
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the public (AOSIS, 2008, p.2; Vanhala 
and Haestbak, 2016). In this context the 
question of compensation is critical, both 
for adaptation strategies which involve the 
acquisition of land, and where a choice is 
made to pay people for the loss or damage 
they have suffered. However, extended 
consideration of the role of compensation 
has been largely absent from discussions 
so far, particularly from a legal perspective. 
Indeed, our experience has been that 
discussion of compensation engenders 
anxiety in many people working on climate 
change issues, a number of whom appear 
to have a preference to avoid the term 
altogether.
In this article, we argue that the idea 
and expression ‘compensation’ is an 
unavoidable aspect of the climate change 
adaptation discussion and explore the 
consequences of this.  Compensation is an 
intrinsic aspect of the law of compulsory 
acquisition. It will also have to be discussed 
when deciding whether to make payments 
to people who have suffered loss or damage. 
The term is well understood and used by 
both lay people and experts. Euphemisms, 
such as ‘assistance’ or ‘transitional 
assistance’, may appear attractive and as 
softening reality. In our view, however, they 
distract from the key policy choices that 
will need to be made, and from the 
established place of compensation in the 
law. This has a number of ramifications. In 
particular, it suggests that careful thought 
should be given, as soon as possible, to the 
development of a principled approach to 
compensation in the climate change 
context. 
Compensation Anxiety 
As the most recent report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change makes clear, climate change will 
have a wide range of effects and many of 
these will cause individuals, business and 
states loss and damage (IPCC, 2018). How 
best to respond is a question currently 
occupying many scholars and policy 
makers. At a practical level central and 
local government are taking a number 
of initiatives (Storey et al, 2017). For 
example, the Climate Change Adaptation 
Technical Working Group was tasked 
with considering how New Zealand might 
build resilience to the challenges of climate 
change. It touches on compensation when 
noting the importance of ensuring New 
Zealand has the financial capacity to deal 
with adaptation to climate change, where 
the costs will fall and how those costs can 
be funded. In making its recommendations 
it encourages the investigation of what an 
appropriate funding mechanism might 
look like and how future costs might be 
reflected in investment and planning 
decisions (Climate Change Adaptation 
Technical Working Group, 2018, Actions 
16 and 17). Scholars are also beginning 
to engage with the issue. In considering 
the question of climate change funding in 
some detail, Boston and Lawrence (2017, 
2018) have highlighted the profound 
ethical and administrative issues that 
need to be addressed in developing any 
principled approach to compensation. 
Although there is a vast legal literature on 
the law of takings and compensation, very 
little of it addresses the emerging question 
of compensation in the context of climate 
change (although see (Berry and Vella, 
2010) which considers the question of 
regulation, property rights and managing 
coastal hazards). 
The absence of detailed discussion is 
surprising, given the important role 
compensation could play in this sphere and 
the widely held popular expectation that 
governments will provide compensation 
payouts for climate change loss and damage 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2017 p12; McCrone, 
2018). However, the view of the general 
population appears to be in stark contrast 
to the views of many of those on the front 
line of decision making. Indeed, our 
experience, supported by anecdotal 
evidence, is that the term ‘compensation’ 
when used in the context of climate change 
causes deep concern and anxiety in policy 
circles. There appears to be an informal 
consensus that the word should not be used 
in this context at all. Rather, to the extent 
the state may pay people money as a result 
of the effects of climate change, other terms 
(usually some variant on ‘assistance’) are 
seen as more appropriate. There may be a 
number of reasons for this, including the 
sheer size of the fiscal risk that will 
accompany climate change (Boston and 
Lawrence 2018; Hino, 2017; Verchick and 
Johnson 2013; Alexander, 2011; Nicholls et 
al, 2010), and the other challenges climate 
change poses on ethical and political levels. 
Questions regarding how to equitably 
distribute the costs of climate change have 
yet to be answered (Hayward, 2008, and 
2017). The role of individual responsibility 
remains unclear, as are the precise 
obligations of the state. Moreover, gaining 
clarity in relation to these considerations 
may simply be a precursor to further 
questions, including what might get 
compensated, and (equally importantly) 
what might not. In such an atmosphere of 
uncertainty, anxiety is understandable. In 
our view, however, while these are 
ultimately questions that will be answered 
on the basis of policy, from a legal 
perspective compensation as a word and a 
concept is unavoidable in this context.   
The Unavoidability of ‘Compensation’ in this 
Context
The idea of compensation is not difficult. 
As Dixon J noted in Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth ([1947] HCA 58; (1947) 75 
CLR 495 at 571): 
… “compensation” is a very well 
understood expression. It is true that 
its meaning has been developed in 
relation to the compulsory acquisition 
of land. But the purpose of 
compensation is the same, whether the 
property taken is real or personal. It is 
to place in the hands of the owner 
New Zealand has a tradition of 
compensation across a wide range of 
areas which can be described as both 
institutionalised and ad hoc. 
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expropriated the full money equivalent 
of the thing of which he has been 
deprived. 
It is inevitable that compensation as an 
idea and expression will arise in the context 
of climate change. Damage and loss are 
certain. Potential responses include 
payments for that loss, or acquisition of 
property to avoid further, or future, harm. 
New Zealand has a tradition of 
compensation across a wide range of areas 
which can be described as both 
institutionalised and ad hoc. It is important 
to recognise that any approach adopted in 
New Zealand will be informed by both 
historical practice and societal expectation. 
The concept of compensation has been 
integral to schemes in the past, it is an 
important concept legally, and appears to 
form part of everyday discussion of what 
the responses to climate change might 
involve. 
‘Takings’ of private property
No area demonstrates the unavoidability 
of compensation better than the law 
surrounding the ‘taking’, or acquisition, 
of private property by the state. A familiar 
example is the power of the Crown to 
compulsorily acquire land under the Public 
Works Act 1981 for a range of ‘public 
works’, such as infrastructure projects 
including roads and airports. There is a 
very long tradition of law relating to these 
powers and this will inevitably be triggered 
where any state driven response to climate 
change affects private property rights. 
As observed by the Supreme Court in 
Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd 
[2007] NZSC 112, [2007] 2 NZLR 149, the 
Magna Carta 1297, c 29 remains statutory 
authority that anything amounting to a 
taking (or acquisition) of private property 
must be authorised by a statute allowing 
for the acquisition in clear terms (at [45]; 
Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, 
Schedule 1; Corfield and Carnwath, 1978, 
p.1). This suggests that where the state 
decides it is necessary to acquire land in the 
context of climate change (or takes steps 
which amount, in law, to a taking) it will 
have to be authorised to do so by way of 
clearly worded legislation. Crucially, 
compensation is an integral part of the 
compulsory acquisition process and will 
have to be considered as part of the 
development of any legislative schemes. As 
noted by Donovan LJ in Birmingham 
Corporation v West Midland Baptist Trust 
[1970] AC 874:
… in any developing community there 
must be a power to take land from 
private owners for public purposes; and 
in society where private ownership of 
land is permitted justice requires that 
compensation should be paid for such 
takings. (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court echoes this in 
Waitakere City where it also observed that 
one of the effects of Magna Carta is that 
where a statute authorises the acquisition of 
land the statutory practice is “to confer 
entitlements to fair compensation where the 
legislature considers land is being taken for 
public purposes under a statutory power” 
(Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd 
at [45] (emphasis added)). Moreover, the 
Supreme Court stressed that the courts have 
been “astute to construe statutes 
expropriating private property to ensure fair 
compensation is paid” (citing Taggart, 1998 
pp. 104 – 105). This is reinforced by the Privy 
Council’s discussion in Director of Buildings 
and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd [1995] 
2 AC 111 at 125 where it noted: 
… the board is guided by the well-
known principle that a statute should 
not be held to take away private rights 
of property without compensation 
unless the intention to do so is expressed 
in clear and unambiguous terms. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
there are no explicit legislative prohibitions 
on state acquisition of property in New 
Zealand. There is no ‘constitutional 
protection’ of private property as found in 
Australia (Commonwealth of Australian 
Constitution Act 1900, s 51(xxxi)) or the 
United States (United States Constitution, 
Amendment 5). Parliament could, 
therefore, conceivably pass legislation 
acquiring land without compensation in 
the context of climate change. However, 
there is a strong general presumption 
against uncompensated acquisition. As Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer explains: 
… it is a recognised principle that the 
state should not appropriate private 
property for public purposes without 
just compensation. But in New Zealand, 
absent any statutory obligation such as 
that contained in the Public Works Act, 
it is a principle that has to be honoured 
by the executive and Parliament. It 
cannot be implemented by the Courts. 
(Palmer, 2001, p.168)
However, from a property lawyer’s 
perspective, it is also almost inconceivable 
that the state would ever take property 
without compensation. It also seems 
extremely unlikely from a political 
perspective. Certainly, we can say that if the 
Crown were to attempt to do this it would 
have to be authorised to do so by very 
clearly worded legislation and a public 
outcry could be anticipated. Indeed, when 
the Crown does take property, even with 
an offer of compensation, it tends to be 
highly contentious. 
The traditional approach to 
compensation is reflected in at least two 
existing legislative schemes allowing the 
state to either acquire property, or when 
state action in relation to property causes 
loss or damage. The Public Works Act 1981 
embodies the most straightforward system 
of compensation for public works in New 
Zealand. The basic proposition is that the 
No area demonstrates the unavoidability 
of compensation between than the law 
surrounding the ‘taking’, or acquisition, 
of private property by the state. 
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Crown (or occasionally other public 
bodies) may acquire land for public works. 
Where the land cannot be acquired 
voluntarily, it can be acquired compulsorily. 
In either case ‘full compensation’ must be 
provided (s 60).  Equally illustrative, are the 
compensation provisions of the Biosecurity 
Act 1993. The overall purpose of this 
legislation is to preserve the integrity of 
New Zealand indigenous flora and fauna. 
The Act provides for compensation to be 
paid to individuals in a number of 
circumstances where measures taken under 
the Act impact on their private property. 
For example, the recent Ministry for 
Primary Industries (MPI)-led response to 
mycoplasma bovis has involved an element 
of compensation (MPI, 2018). Section 
162A of the Act provides that in certain 
circumstances a person or business is 
entitled to ‘compensation’ where the MPI 
has exercised powers and a loss has resulted, 
either because property has been damaged 
or destroyed, or because restrictions have 
been imposed on the movement of goods. 
In relation to mycoplasma bovis 
compensation has flowed for losses 
incurred as a result of MPI directives to 
shield the dairy economy by culling dairy 
herds (MPI, 2018).
In line with the Supreme Court’s 
comments in Waitakere City both the 
Public Works Act and the Biosecurity Act 
demonstrate the clarity adopted by 
legislation providing for state interference 
with private property rights. They also 
illustrate the presumption that 
compensation will be paid in this context. 
Both Acts explicitly use the word 
‘compensation’ and each serve to highlight 
that successive New Zealand governments 
have made an explicit policy choice to 
ensure that individuals whose property is 
affected by governmental intervention are 
compensated. 
Of course, there are many state actions 
that can be taken in relation to private 
property that do not amount to 
acquisitions. There is no presumption of 
compensation for ‘regulatory takings’ (the 
imposition of policies or rules on private 
property justified as safeguards on the 
grounds of public health) such as most 
regulations imposed by the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (see s 85; Palmer, 
2017, para 15.1.01). Authorities will have 
recourse to many climate change response 
measures that will fall short of a ‘taking’, 
but compensation will need to be 
considered where people are denied the 
ability to use or live on their land as a result 
of public decision making, even if this does 
not amount to a full acquisition by the 
Crown. 
Overall, it would be an incredible break 
with past tradition if, in the context of 
climate change, the state took steps to take 
private property (or took actions which 
amounted in law to a taking even if there 
is no acquisition by the state) and did not 
provide compensation. It is also difficult to 
see how the word compensation could be 
avoided in this context. Any euphemism 
for a taking (such as ‘transitional 
assistance’) would be likely be treated as 
just that, would not necessarily be of legal 
effect, and would be best avoided. 
Payments for loss and damage outside the 
law of takings
Beyond the narrow confines of the law 
on takings, however, it must also be 
recognised that New Zealand has a long 
tradition of the state making payments 
to people who have suffered damage to 
their property as a result of adverse events 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2017). In our view, 
although it might be possible to argue that 
such payments are not ‘compensation’ in 
a strict sense as they are not necessarily 
payments made as a result of state action 
incurring a loss, the reality is that most 
people would view such payments as 
compensation. 
The Earthquake Commission Act 1993 
provides a good example. In addition to 
establishing the Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) the Long Title to the Act indicates 
that its overall purpose is to ‘to make 
provision with respect to the insurance of 
residential property against damage caused 
by certain natural disasters’. This includes, 
but is not limited to, earthquake, natural 
landslip or tsunami (s 2; Boston, 2017). 
Where land is damaged the EQC may pay 
the affected owner various sums, within 
certain specified limits (s 19). The language 
of ‘insurance’ is interesting here, as it 
technically avoids the use of ‘compensation’. 
However, this does not stop people using 
the word ‘compensation’ in the EQC 
context. For example, in 2005 the (then) 
general manager of EQC noted: 
We pay compensation for land around 
a property that is damaged and cannot 
be used again … EQC’s recent claims 
history has featured an increasing 
proportion of payouts in compensation 
for loss of land. For example, over 60 
per cent of the amount payable to 
residents of the Bay of Plenty following 
the storm in May is compensation for 
land loss. (Bridges and Conchie, 2005) 
This suggests that even where the word 
compensation is carefully avoided people 
are likely to adopt the word in any event. 
Indeed, the use of the word compensation 
in a vernacular rather than specific sense 
appears quite common. For example, a 
recent newspaper article considering 
whether Brighton and Southshore in 
Christchurch have a habitable future in 
light of sea-level rise quotes one resident 
as stating ‘We want the risk that has been 
thrust upon us dealt with – compensated 
in the form of payment or mitigated in the 
form of hazard protection’ (McCrone, 
2018).
Clearly, legislators have choices about 
how they frame payments made to 
individuals for loss. This need not involve 
‘compensation’ per se. For example, the 
... We want the risk that has 
been thrust upon us dealt with – 
compensated in the form of payment 
or mitigated in the form of hazard 
protection ...
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residential red zones declared in 
Christchurch after the Canterbury 
Earthquakes of 2010/2011 involved a 
Crown offer to purchase insured residential 
properties in those red zones (Tarrant, 
2011; Quake Outcasts v Minister for 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery [2015] 
NZSC 27, [2016] 1 NZLR 1) and not 
‘compensation’ as such. That said, the 
Cabinet Paper outlining the proposal and 
seeking Cabinet agreement drew a 
distinction between the suggested approach 
to insured and uninsured properties partly 
on the basis that the Crown offering to buy 
uninsured proprieties would ‘compensate 
for uninsured damage’ (at para [32] and 
6.1).  This also suggests that even when 
framed as an offer to purchase, decision 
makers were thinking in terms of 
‘compensation’. The Supreme Court itself 
certainly seems to have framed the scheme 
in terms of ‘compensation’ as well, with the 
majority observing that it was not to be 
taken as ‘suggesting that the decisions to 
compensate at 2007 rateable values for the 
insured group … was in any way 
inappropriate’ (at [160]). It follows that 
there will be no escaping either the word, 
or the concept, of compensation when 
confronting the question of how to respond 
to the effects of climate change. 
Compensation for Climate Change 
Acquisition, Damage and Loss
The fact that compensation is unavoidable 
in this context has a number of 
ramifications. It suggests that it is critical 
to consider: whether compensation will 
be provided (and how to make it clear it 
is not to be provided if that is the policy 
choice made); under what circumstances 
compensation must be provided; whether 
any current scheme may already mandate 
compensation; and what new schemes need 
to be developed. As noted, in the context 
of compulsory acquisition compensation 
is almost certain to be required, although 
it may arguably not be required for state 
actions that do not amount to a taking. 
Clarity will help those tasked with the 
ultimate decision about whether or not 
compensation is to be provided in this 
context. It is also important because 
decisions in this sphere are likely to 
influence how climate change responses are 
both framed and developed. Whether or 
not compensation is legally required will 
be an important starting point in 
discussions about whether people should 
move, or be moved, away from high risk 
areas. Even if there is no legal requirement 
but there is a moral imperative to 
compensate (or if compensation may be 
necessary to achieve a particular end 
without protracted and risky litigation) 
clarity will be crucial. 
Clearly, New Zealand has a strong 
societal expectation of compensation and 
a culture of government action to 
recompense for individual loss (Boston and 
Lawrence, 2017). However, it appears that 
none of the existing frameworks are robust 
enough to deal with the effects of climate 
change. For example, while the regime set 
up under the Earthquake Commission Act 
does respond to some types of natural 
hazards (for example payments under the 
Earthquake Commission scheme for land 
slips or increased flooding vulnerability) 
(Earthquake Commission Act 1993, Part 
2), this is no guarantee that it will remain 
fit for purpose in the context of climate 
change (Boston and Lawrence, 2018). 
In essence the EQC is a reactive body 
not dissimilar to a publicly funded insurer. 
The premise is that the government has a 
role to play in facilitating recovery in the 
aftermath of predetermined unforeseeable 
and catastrophic events. However, access to 
its funds is limited to those people who 
have taken out private insurance (s 18) and 
it is funded by way of a levy collected as 
part of those private insurance policies. 
Presumably, one of the policies 
underpinning this scheme is that it is 
justified on the basis that the compensation 
paid out to those affected will not only 
assist them individually, but also provides 
benefits on a community level. While 
anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
interested parties consider that this 
framework may be called upon to address 
natural hazards caused by climate change, 
this is far from certain given it has not been 
developed in the context of climate change 
and will not cover all of the potential events 
that climate change may cause, nor does it 
cover all of the people who are likely to be 
affected. Moreover, the approach the 
scheme takes to ‘insurance’ (or 
‘compensation’) may also fit uneasily with 
the effects of climate change. A payment 
calculated on the basis of how much it 
might cost to remediate land may not be 
appropriate in circumstances where land 
no longer exists or cannot be remediated 
for a reasonable cost. Given the predicted 
effects of climate change payments 
calculated on the basis of one-off, discrete 
events, would also need to be reassessed 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2017).
Similar observations can be made about 
the Public Works Act. The premise 
underpinning the Crown’s powers under 
this Act is partly based upon the Crown 
holding radical title to most of the land in 
New Zealand, but also that where land is 
acquired for a public work, the collective 
return supersedes the cost to the individual. 
Thus, the Crown (and in some cases others) 
is empowered to take land for a ‘public 
work’ which is defined, in essence, as ‘a 
Government … work that the Crown … is 
authorised to construct, undertake, 
The premise underpinning the Crown’s 
powers under [the Public Works Act] is 
partly based upon the Crown holding 
radical title to most of the land in New 
Zealand, but also that where land is 
acquired for a public work, the collective 
return supersedes the cost to the individual.
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establish, manage, operate or maintain …’ 
(s 2). Although broadly defined, it is not 
clear that a ‘managed retreat’ (a planned 
and progressive retreat from high risk areas 
(Nolon, 2014)) would amount to a ‘public 
work’. The purpose of taking land in this 
context would be to abandon it completely, 
not to develop it. Moreover, the purpose of 
the Act itself may sit uneasily with the 
imperatives of climate change. It appears 
to be predicated on the idea that land can 
be acquired to avoid the problem of 
holdouts, facilitate economic development 
and increase aggregate social wealth. 
However, this appears irreconcilable in a 
situation where land is acquired to avoid 
harm and with the intention it be 
abandoned. How to calculate the quantum 
of compensation may also need to be 
reconsidered. Compensation under the 
Public Works Act is calculated by way of a 
number of rules including that the value 
of the land is to be assessed on the basis of 
the amount the land would realise if sold 
on the open market by a willing seller and 
a willing buyer (s 62). Whether such an 
approach would remain appropriate where 
the land may have no value at all, and where 
the risk associated with that land has been 
known for some time, are questions that 
would need to be considered. It seems likely 
that complete acquisitions in the context 
of climate change would need bespoke 
legislation, within which the role of 
compensation would need careful thought.
That neither the EQC or Public Works 
Act schemes will work easily in the climate 
change context suggests that the existing 
frameworks need to be revisited, or new 
ones developed. However, to these existing 
statutory schemes, a range of what might 
be termed ‘ad hoc’ approaches to recovery 
can be added. The residential red zones 
declared in Christchurch after the 
Canterbury Earthquakes of 2010/2011 are 
perhaps the best example. The Crown offer 
to purchase affected property was justified 
for a range of reasons, including the extent 
of work that would need to be done to 
remediate such large areas of land and the 
consequent uncertainty and dislocation for 
people living in those areas (Tarrant, 2011; 
Quake Outcasts v Minister for Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery [2015] NZSC 27, 
[2016] 1 NZLR 1). Further examples 
include: the ‘liveable homes project’ 
developed by the Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council to fund the repair of homes after 
the Edgecumbe floods in 2017 (New 
Zealand Herald, 2017); the $4 million 
provided by the Ministry for Primary 
Industries following the Kaikoura 
earthquakes to help farmers and growers 
determine what to do with their land (MPI, 
2017); and a Mayoral fund established by 
the Dunedin City Council in June 2017 to 
help those affected by flooding in South 
Dunedin who could not find assistance by 
other means (Dunedin City Council, 2017). 
This sort of ad hoc approach to 
compensating people for the adverse effects 
of natural events both underlines the 
expectation held by many that the state will 
step in when things go wrong (Boston and 
Lawrence, 2017), but is unlikely to provide 
an appropriately principled framework for 
dealing with the anticipated increase in 
these sorts of events as climate change 
accelerates. This further highlights the need 
for careful thought to be given to when 
compensation will apply, and what 
alternative approaches might look like. In 
the absence of detailed discussion it is 
important to consider how, beyond existing 
schemes, loss as a result of climate change 
may be dealt with. 
Towards a Principled Approach 
Beyond the presumption that compulsory 
acquisition of property will be accompanied 
by compensation, the question of whether 
those people whose property or incomes 
will be affected by climate change should 
receive compensation is a difficult one 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2018). It is also, at 
least at first instance, a policy choice. As 
noted, a fundamental question is which 
effects a climate change compensation 
scheme should cover. One response would 
be that compensation should only flow 
for state decisions that impose limits on 
existing property rights. That is not the 
only approach, however, and it would be 
perfectly possible to compensate for any 
damage to property, or loss of income, 
caused by adverse events (Boston and 
Lawrence, 2018; Sprinz and von Bünau 
2013).  
Ideally, a principled approach to the 
question of where the costs of climate 
change should fall would be developed, 
with consideration of how to implement 
this legally (and in light of the existing legal 
landscape) coming once the policy choices 
have been made, although the law will have 
an impact on what choices are available.  
Consideration of the policy questions 
has begun. Boston and Lawrence have 
noted some of the reasons why any public 
compensation for losses will be complicated 
to address (2018). They suggest that given 
New Zealand’s tradition of spreading the 
risk of natural disasters through cost 
sharing mechanisms, any statement that no 
compensation will be made in the context 
of climate change is unlikely to believed. A 
decision not to compensate would also lead 
to increased pressure for expensive 
protective works. Conversely, a decision to 
compensate would have to account for 
factors such as perceived inequalities where 
individuals are compensated in relation to 
second or third homes, and the risk of 
‘moral hazard’ (the dual concern that 
people get compensated for risk they have 
knowingly taken, and that there is less 
incentive to guard against risk if one knows 
that compensation will be paid). Any 
scheme would also need to be consistent 
and have sufficient cross-party political 
support to withstand changing 
administrations over time (Boston and 
That neither the EQC or Public Works 
Act schemes will work easily in the 
climate change context suggests that 
the existing frameworks need to be 
revisited, or new ones developed. 
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Lawrence, 2018). While it is beyond the 
scope of this article to consider the ethical 
arguments in any detail, it seems inarguable 
that any regime settled on should be 
‘consistent with widely accepted principles 
of social equity (or distributive justice)’ 
(Boston and Lawrence, 2018, citing 
Kunreuther and Pauly, 2017). 
Clearly, law has an important role in 
this discussion, but it is a subsidiary one, 
at least at first instance. It helps to shape 
the start of the conversation as it dictates 
the state’s ultimate powers in this sphere. 
For example, in the context of takings, it is 
clear that there are no constitutional 
impediments to the Crown’s ability to 
compulsorily acquire property. Conversely, 
it is clear that it can only do so when 
authorised by a clearly worded statute. This 
will be accompanied by a strong 
presumption that compensation will be 
paid for that taking. 
Beyond these factors, law will also have 
a role in determining both the manner of 
the imposition of any regime and its 
governance once put in place. These are 
factors that should also be considered in 
developing a principled approach to 
climate change adaptation in general and 
compensation in particular. Administrative 
law, including judicial review, natural 
justice and access to justice considerations 
will be unavoidable. The role of existing 
precedent will need to be considered. The 
availability of  compensation for 
compulsory acquisition, for example, is 
guided by a number of existing rules 
(including that compensation flows for the 
depreciation in value of the property and 
not for a loss of profits or income (Palmer, 
2017, para 15.5.02)). Whether existing 
pieces of legislation are fit for purpose will 
also, ultimately, be legal questions. For 
example, whether or not the Resource 
Management Act is the appropriate 
mechanism for effecting a managed retreat 
remains open (France-Hudson, 2018). 
Beyond the question of whether it is 
possible to use the Act for this purpose, lies 
the question of whether a decision to 
‘retreat’ should be made at the national or 
community level. The current scheme of 
the Act suggests that, for the most part 
decisions affecting a community should be 
made by the community, but where large 
sums of money are involved and difficult 
decisions need to be made, the local level 
may not be appropriate (Boston, 2017). 
Thus, the law will help to identify who (if 
anyone) is empowered to make a decision, 
and the process by which such a decision 
can be made. Law will also provide the 
options available if new processes are seen 
as necessary, although ultimately this will 
be a policy question in the first instance. 
Any scheme, ad hoc or comprehensive, 
will also have to be one that is defensible 
in terms of an initial plan, policy, and 
obligations under the law. For example, the 
majority of the Supreme Court in Quake 
Outcasts ultimately decided in favour of the 
uninsured land owners, not because a 
decision against compensating a specific 
group was unenforceable, but because 
‘[t]he red zone decisions were made on a 
community wide basis and this suggests a 
whole of community approach’ (at [187]). 
It followed that uninsured landowners were 
entitled to some level of compensation 
because they were part of the community 
for which the plan had been created. Thus, 
while the court recognised that a decision 
not to compensate was perfectly defensible, 
it could not be made in isolation, and had 
to have regard to the ultimate purpose of 
offering compensation to some people. 
This appears to be in line with Boston and 
Lawrence’s (2018) identification of 
comparative justice as an ethical 
consideration in this sphere. If some groups 
receive compensation and some do not, 
there ought to be a very good reason distin-
guishing between them. The law will help 
to police this boundary, and how it does so 
is something that can be assessed ex ante 
in light of existing doctrines and precedent. 
Indeed the Quake Outcasts ruling may 
already stand as legal precedent for the fact 
that any action deemed a ‘community 
response’ creates an obligation to treat the 
designated area uniformly. Certainly, such 
a precedent should inform the development 
of broader guiding principles in this 
context, such as ensuring the consistent 
treatment of people throughout the 
country and over time.
The law, therefore, in the context of 
compensation as with everything else, does 
have a role in the development of a 
principled approach as it both accompanies 
some of the ethical decisions that need to 
be made, but also because it is the only way 
in which the policy decisions taken can be 
implemented in practice. This is a critical 
point and should not be overlooked in the 
development of tools to deal with the 
effects of climate change. Careful thought 
must be given to the desired outcome, how 
that outcome can actually be implemented 
and how that implementation will interact 
with the existing body of law. 
Conclusion 
Loss and damage is, and will be, a major 
consequence of climate change. It follows 
that compensation, both as a word 
and legal concept, will be unavoidable. 
Whether or not compensation is paid 
for any of the effects of climate change is 
ultimately a policy question. This will be 
informed by a range of factors including: 
the grip compensation has on the popular 
imagination; the legal importance of the 
concept for state acquisition of private 
property; and the role that it has played 
across a number of different statutory and 
ad hoc response to loss in the past. It is, 
therefore, important that compensation 
as a topic is not avoided, but is expressly 
acknowledged as forming part of the 
wider discussion about climate change 
adaptation and how best to respond. 
The current scheme of the Act suggests 
that ... where large sums of money are 
involved and difficult decisions need 
to be made, the local level may not be 
appropriate 
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Sir Peter Gluckman ONZ KNZM 
FMedSci FRSNZ FRS was the first Chief 
Science Advisor to the Prime Minister 
of New Zealand from 2009 to 2018 and 
developed New Zealand’s departmental 
Science Advisors network. He also acted 
as Science Envoy for the New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
and coordinated the secretariat of the 
Small Advanced Economies Initiative. 
He is chair of the International Network 
of Government Science Advice (INGSA) 
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Over the past decade New Zealand has developed a 
science advisory mechanism to assist the executive 
of government. This development can be seen as 
part of an international trend to enhance the science-
policy interface (using science in the broadest sense 
to encapsulate the robust knowledge disciplines). 
This interface is complex and multidimensional. 
Scientific evidence assists the decision-making 
process leading to enhanced choices between 
policy options, but there are significant issues 
on the supply side, the demand side and at the 
interface. There is no area of government where 
robust evidence cannot advance the policy process. 
Data alone are not information, information without 
expert analysis is not knowledge, and knowledge 
itself only becomes evidence when appropriately 
applied to the question in hand.
Sir Peter will review current thinking about 
the processes, structures and skill sets needed to 
improve the incorporation of evidence into policy. 
It is essential that these processes are robust; 
however, the trend towards applying generic policy 
evaluation methods rather than deep domain 
expertise can crimp the potential for robust 
evidence to usefully impact on the policy decisions.
New challenges are emerging. These include the 
size of the scientific enterprise, the incorporation 
of different epistemologies, the confused state 
of accessible and reliable knowledge on the web, 
and the impacts of digitalisation that will allow 
Big Data and AI to impact on public policy. While 
New Zealand has been at the forefront of these 
latter areas with the Integrated Data Infrastructure 
programme, major issues have emerged and will 
continue to emerge, in part because of the failure to 
get adequate data governance in place.
The so-called ‘post-truth’ dynamic, which has 
yet to extensively infect New Zealand, undermines 
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the role of evidence in policy-making. In the current 
international political climate it is becoming ever-
more apparent that robust evidential input into 
policy is a core part of protecting democracy. 
Sir Peter will use examples from his experience 
to explore these issues and reflect on general 
and emerging principles relating to all-important 
knowledge brokerage. He will also highlight some 
research questions he is hoping to address.
